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STATE FAILURE AND THE USE OF FORCE 
IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR 
BEN N. DUNLAP* 
Abstract: The expansion of U.S. counterterrorist operations throughout 
the world coincides with a growing sense among some U.S. policymakers 
that so-called "failed states" pose grave threats to international security. 
The governments of failed states have weakened to the point that they 
can no longer provide public goods, such as territorial integrity, 
economic infrastructure, and physical security. U.S. defense strategists 
suspect that the lawlessness of failed states may do more to undermine 
security in the United States than direct confrontation by hostile 
governments. Denying terrorists the sanctuary they seek in failed states 
may become a central feature in the war on terror, and it is likely that the 
United States will use preemptive force against suspected terrorists inside 
a state that is incapable of policing itself. This Note examines the legality 
of using preemptive military force against suspected terrorists located in 
failed states. 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 19, 2003, armed U.S. commandos snatched up a sus-
pected al Qaeda terrorist in Mogadishu, Somalia and transported him 
out of the country for questioning .I The commandos conducted their 
raid without assistance from any government authority in Somalia.2 
The United States' decision to intervene unilaterally was no doubt 
influenced by the fact that since 1992 Somalia has lacked a central 
government capable of providing the most basic services to its people, 
much less mounting assaults against sophisticated terrorist groups 
within its borders.3 
* Ben N. Dunlap is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor of the Boston College Intnc 
national & Comparative Law Review. 
1 Adrian Blomfield, U.S. Snatches Terror Suspect in Somalia, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), 
Mar. 20, 2003, at 17. The suspected terrorist was a Yemeni with a South African passport 
hiding in Somalia. !d. 
2 !d. 
3 See U.S. State Department, Background Note: Somalia (Oct. 2003), http://www. 
state.gov /r/ pa/ ei/bgn/2863pf.htm. 
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Commando raids like the one in Somalia may become common 
in the U.S.-led "war on terror."4 The expansion of counterterrorist 
operations throughout the world coincides with a growing sense 
among some policymakers that so-called "failed states" pose grave 
threats to international security.5 Failed states, as defined by policy 
analysts and legal scholars, are those countries whose governments 
have weakened to the point that they can no longer provide public 
goods, such as territorial integrity, economic infrastructure, and 
physical security.6 U.S. defense strategists suspect that the lawlessness 
of failed states may do more to undermine security in the United 
States than direct confrontation by hostile governments.7 Unlike state 
sponsors of terror, failed states do not necessarily welcome terrorists; 
they may simply be unable to impose order and project sufficient 
authority within their borders to make themselves inhospitable to ter-
rorist groups.8 Moreover, they serve as "attractive safe havens and stag-
ing grounds" for terrorist groups and, in many cases, afford terrorists 
easy access to valuable commodities, such as diamonds and drugs, 
that help fund their activities.9 Some policymakers fear that in the age 
of international terror, failed states pose dangers not only to them-
selves and their neighbors, but also to people around the globe. 10 
4 Thorn Shanker & James Risen, Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by Military Units, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1. 
5 SeeTHE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1, 10-11 
(2002) [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY]. 
6 See Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FoREIGN PoL'Y, Dec. 
1992, at 3. But cf generally Ralph Wilde, The Skewed Responsibility Narrative of the 'Failed States' 
Concept, 9 ILSAJ. INT'L & CoMP. L. 425 (2003). 
7 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 10-11. 
8 See Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for the 
American Empire, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar.-Apr. 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Forafr File; Susan E. 
Rice, U.S. Foreign Assistance and Failed States, Working Paper for the Brookings Website, at 
http:/ /www.brook.edu/views/papers/rice/20021125.htm (Nov. 25, 2002). There are some 
exceptions to this proposition, however, as in the case of the Sudan, which is both a state 
sponsor of terrorism and a failed state. See Gerard Prunier & Rachel M. Gisselquist, The Su-
dan: A Sttccessful~v Failed State, in STATE FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR 
101 (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2003) ("The Sudan today is indeed a failed state ... ."); U.S. 
STATE DEPARTMENT, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 68 (2002), http:/ /www.state.gov/s/ 
ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/pdf/ ("Sudan ... remained a designated state sponsor of terrorism."). 
This paradox may be explained by the fact that the Sudan's government, to the extent it 
functions, has provided support for terrorist organizations. Moreover, the Sudan is essentially 
split between the partially functioning north and nonfunctioning south. See Robert I. Rot-
berg, The New Nature of Nation-State Failure, 25 WAsH. Q. 85, 88 (2002). 
9 Rice, supra note 8. 
10 Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug. 2002, 
LEXIS, News Library, Forafr File [hereinafter Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror]. 
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The Bush Administration's National Security Strategy highlights 
the problem of failed states. 11 On its opening page, the report de-
clares: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we 
are by failing ones."12 The report continues: "[P]overty, weak institu-
tions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist 
networks ... within their borders. "1 3 
Denying terrorists the sanctuary they seek in failed states may be-
come a central feature of the war on terror.14 The surest method for 
denying havens for terrorists in failed states is to prevent and reverse 
state failure itself.15 The Bush Administration's strategic plan pledges 
to "help strengthen Mrica's fragile states, help build indigenous ca-
pability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforce-
ment and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists."16 
Yet, strengthening weak states to the point where their weakness is no 
longer an "attractive nuisance" for terrorists may require a decades-
long commitment of financial and humanitarian aid, technical and 
military assistance, and institution-buildingP A massive state-building 
effort, even with unlimited resources, would likely require years of 
incremental progress before it produced meaningful results.IS Dis-
patching military advisers to states whose central governments have 
collapsed is also unlikely to make the United States safer in the Im-
mediate future.l9 
11 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 1, 10-11. 
12 !d. at 1. 
1 ~ !d. at v. 
14 See id. at Y, 1. See generally BRIAN jENKINS, CouNTERING AL QAEDA: AN APPRECIATION 
OF TilE SITUATION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR STRATEGY 17-21 (2002); Mallaby, supra note 8. 
15 Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 1 0; Rice, supra note 8. 
16 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 10-11. It remains to be seen whether 
significant resources will be devoted to the long-term, non-military task of shoring up weak 
governments around the world (not only in Africa, but in Asia, Europe, and Latin America 
too) by a U.S. administration focused on short-term, military solutions. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, 
Somalia Talks Are Stormy, But They Still Inch Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, § 1, at 8 (describ-
ing lack of U.S. engagement in the peace process in Somalia, despite concerns about instabil-
ity and terrorism). 
1' See generally Tom Carothers, Promoting Democracy and Fighting Termr, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, 
Jan.-Feb. 2003, LEXIS, News Library, Forafr File; Mallaby, supra note 8 (discussing the 
costs of institution-building in failed states). 
IS See HENRY KissiNGER, DIPLOMACY 453-54 (1994) (describing the United States' 
level of commitment to democracy-building after World War II); Malia by, supra note 8. 
19 See generally DANA PRIEST, THE MISSION: WAGING WAR AND KEEPING PEACE WITII 
AMERICA's MILITARY 179-81 (2003) (describing the challenges of proYiding training to 
military personnel in a weak state like Nigeria). 
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In the meantime, the United States' new security strategy empha-
sizes the preemptive use of military solutions to remove threats in the 
near term.2° This strategy has been borne out in Iraq, and it is only 
logical to expect that it will be applied to other perceived threats that 
require immediate attention. 21 In the case of failed states, U.S. officials 
fear that terrorists can exploit states' weaknesses and strike the United 
States and its allies without warning. 22 Thus, it is likely that in the war 
on terror the United States will use preemptive force against terrorists 
inside states that are incapable of policing themselves.23 
The United States and its allies are preparing for the use of lim-
ited military force to capture or destroy terrorist groups operating in 
third world countries.24 Unlike the U.S.-led military operations in M-
ghanistan, which combined hunting terrorists with occupation and 
regime change, operations against terrorist groups hiding in failed 
states will likely feature more limited uses of force, such as Hellfire 
missile strikes (perhaps launched by the CIA's unmanned aircraft) or 
commando raids designed to capture or kill terrorist operatives.25 
Force might also be used to secure, disarm, or destroy weapons of 
mass destruction in danger of falling into terrorist hands.26 
In September 2002, the United States deployed 800 Special Forces 
personnel to Djibouti to set up a base camp for counter-terrorist opera-
20 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15. 
21 David E. Sanger & Steven R. Weisman, Bush's Aides Envision New Influence in Region, 
N.Y TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at Bll. 
22 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15. 
23 See Thorn Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Moves Commandos to Base in East Africa, N.Y 
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A20 ("The Pentagon is even now drafting potential tactics for 
covert missions against terrorists in countries where there is no responsible local govern-
ment or where the local authorities would object to American action."). 
24 See john Donnelly, Terrorism Traced to Somalia: Citing Terror Threat, U.S. Boosts Military, 
Intelligence in Somalia, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2002, at AI (noting that "U.S. special forces 
have been operating inside Somalia during recent months on a variety of surveillance mis-
sions"); Mark Fineman, New Phase of War on Terror Moves to E. Africa, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 
2002, at AI (discussing U.S. plans to "track-and attack-terrorist suspects throughout the 
seven-nation region of Somalia, Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Sudan"); 
Shanker & Risen, supra note 4 (reporting Pentagon plans to send Special Forces to capture 
or kill al Qaeda members "in countries where the United States is not at open war and, in 
some cases, where the local government is not informed of their presence"). 
25 See Donnelly, supra note 24 (describing a U.S. Predator drone attack in Yemen that 
killed a senior al Qaeda official and the opening of a base camp in Djibouti for U.S. special 
forces and CIA teams that will carry out missions throughout the Horn of Mrica). See gen-
erally PRIEST, supra note 19, at 127-28 (describing the types of missions, including counter-
terrorist assaults, carried out by special forces units). 
26 See Shanker & Risen, supra note 4. 
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tions throughout the Middle East and the Horn of Mrica.27 In the fall 
and winter of 2002, Pentagon planners were preparing for missions 
targeting al Qaeda terrorists "in their safe houses or as they travel the 
world to coordinate attacks or seek havens. "28 These plans envision 
Special Operations units striking deep inside countries where the 
United States is not at war, and in some cases where the local govern-
ment is not even informed oftheir presence.29 
This Note examines the legality of using preemptive military force 
against terrorists located in failed or failing states. 30 Part I explores the 
combined threats of failed states and global terror. Part II discusses in-
ternational law governing the use of force, noting that pre-emptive 
strikes against terrorists in another country are probably not legal. Part 
m analyzes the legal justification for the use of force against terrorists 
in failed states, finding that in some circumstances limited force may 
conform to existing international norms. It further proposes that a 
"failed state doctrine" should be legally justifiable in light of the chal-
lenges posed by state failure, global terrorism, and proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. Part IV concludes by noting the need for 
combining a short-term strategy of combatting terrorist groups with a 
long-term strategy of preventing and reversing state failure. 
I. THE COMBINED THREATS OF FAILED STATES AND GLOBAL TERROR 
A. State Failure: Why It Poses a Threat 
Since September 11, 2001 many countries have implemented 
strict measures aimed at eliminating terrorists operating within their 
borders.3I Others, like Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia, are 
making efforts to pursue terrorist groups in their territory with 
significant assistance from the United States.32 Failed states, in con-
27 Shanker & Schmitt, supra note 23. 
28 !d. 
29 !d. 
!10 This Note does not address the legality of assassinations or targeted killings of sus-
pected terrorists. For more on that question, see generally Nathan Canestaro, American 
Law and Policy on Assassinations of Foreign Leaders: The Practicality of Maintaining the Status 
Qy,o, 27 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 1 (2003). 
51 See, e.g., For Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls, THE EcONOMIST, Aug. 31, 2002, at 18-20. 
52 See, e.g., Back to the jungle, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 1, 2003, at 41 ("American troops are 
on their way back to the Philippines .... to help the Philippine army wipe out Abu Sayyaf, 
a gang ... on America's list of terrorists."); The Other War, THE EcoNOMIST, Mar. 8, 2003, at 
24 (describing the capture by Pakistani authorities of al Qaeda suspect Khalid Sheikh Mo-
hammed); When Local Anger Joins Global Hate, THE EcONOMIST, Oct. 19, 2002, at 23 ("Indo-
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trast, may not be able to cope with terrorists operating from their ter-
ritory even with outside assistance.33 These states lack not only the so-
phisticated military resources needed to combat terrorists, but also 
the ability to fulfill the most basic functions of a state. 34 
The problem of failed states is not new, and, although scholars 
disagree on what to call failed states and how to prevent their col-
lapse, there is general consensus about some of the causes and char-
acteristics of them.35 State failure may be brought about by civil war, 
severe economic depression, extreme government corruption, or a 
combination of these and other factors. 36 While the specific circum-
stances in each state are different, failed states share some common 
characteristics.37 Their governments are unable to project power 
within their borders. 38 They are unable to provide the most funda-
mental services that make up the state's obligations in its contract 
with society: first and foremost physical security, but also basic health 
care, education, transportation and communications infrastructure, 
monetary and banking systems, and a system for resolving disputes.39 
Sudan is often cited as a failed state.40 At least two million Suda-
nese have died since Sudan's second civil war began in 1983, 400,000 
fled to neighboring countries, and another four million have been 
internally displaced.41 In the south, where most of the fighting has 
taken place, the state does not provide security, communications in-
frastructure, medical services, or an education system.42 Notably, tens 
of thousands of women and children have been abducted and en-
nesia had just begun to crack down both on possible international terrorists and on local 
militant groups. Since September 11th, it had been co-operating with America behind the 
scenes .... "). 
33 See generally Rice, supra note 8 (discussing the inability of failed states to control their 
territory). 
34 See id. 
35 See Rachel Stohl & Michael Stohl, Fatally Flawed1 U.S. Policy Toward Failed States, THE 
DEFENSE MONITOR, Oct. 2001, at 1. 
36 See generally Robert I. Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and In-
dicators, in STATE fAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR, supra note 8, at 3-10 
(discussing the flawed institutions and infrastructure associated with failed states) [herein-
after Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States]. 
37 See id. at 2 (citing the inability to deliver political goods as a distinguishing charac-
teristic offailed states). 
38 See Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 10. 
39 See Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, supra note 36, at 3. 
40 Prunier & Gisselquist, supra note 8, at 101. 
41 Id. at 103. 
42 ld. 
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slaved in Sudan since 1983.43 About two and a half million Sudanese 
subsist on United Nations (U.N.) food aid.44 Meanwhile, a number of 
international terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, continue to use 
Sudan as a safe haven.45 
Somalia, too, is commonly considered a failed state.46 U.S. mili-
tary officials have expressed concerns that the transitional national 
government in Somalia controls little territory, has poorly trained and 
equipped military and police forces, and has little influence in the 
countryside.47 Somalia's 3200-mile coastline is virtually unpoliced.48 
U.S. officials have long suspected that al Qaeda is using Somalia as a 
safe haven or even as a staging area for terrorist activities. 49 
Others commonly classified as failed states are Mghanistan, An-
gola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, 
and Sierra Leone.5° Categories of weak and failed states are constantly 
shifting.51 Some states, like Colombia and Indonesia, still function but 
are in danger of failing.52 U.S. policymakers are also concerned about 
the risk of state failure in Pakistan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbeki-
stan. 53 Others were in danger of failing a few years ago but have man-
aged to regain control and strengthen state institutions since then.54 
Until the war on terror, state failure was seen mainly as a humani-
tarian problem.55 Indeed, the populations of failed and collapsed 
states are the ones who suffer most from the chaos, violence, and pov-
erty brought about by their governments' failings. 56 Humanitarian 
and economic aid is in many cases an effective response to state fail-
43 !d. 
44 !d. 
45 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 8. 
46 See Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 10. 
47 Bryan Bender, U.S. Aids Yemen's Antiterror Units, BosTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2002, at 
A27. 
48 !d. 
49 Douglas Frantz, Unsafe Havens: Around the World, Hints of Afghanistans to Come, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 26, 2002, § 4, at 5; see also Donnelly, supra note 24. 
50 Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, supra note 36, at 10. 
51 See Rice, supra note 8 (discussing categories of failed or failing states). 
52 See Rot berg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 10; Rice, supra note 8. 
53 Frantz, supra note 49. 
54 For example, some scholars argued that Russia was on the verge of state failure in 
the late 1990s. See Paul Goble, When States Fail, RADIO FREE EuROPE/RADio LIBERTY (Aug. 
26, 1998), at http:/ /www.rferl.org/features/1998/08/f.ru.980826124223.asp. See generally 
ANATOL LIEVEN, CHECHNYA: TOMBSTONE OF RUSSIAN POWER 1-2 (1998). 
55 See Rotberg, Failed States in a World ojTerro1; supra note 10. 
56 See id. 
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ure.57 Yet, in the age of global terror, when terrorist groups prey on 
weak governments and thrive in anarchic environments to finance 
and plan their activities, U.S. policymakers have begun to focus on 
failed states as a danger both to themselves and to others in the inter-
national community.58 
The concerns of analysts and policymakers about failed states can 
be summed up in three main points. First, their lawlessness allows ter-
rorist organizations to conduct activities without fear of capture or 
punishment.59 Failed states are too weak, distracted, and corrupt to 
find and eliminate terrorist groups within their borders.60 Second, 
state failure allows terrorist organizations access to resources they 
need to conduct their activities, including money and recruits.61 
Failed states are often havens for criminal activities, such as drug 
trafficking and diamond smuggling, that terrorist groups use to 
finance their operations.62 Third, failed states offer terrorists the 
cover of state sovereignty.63 While terrorists take refuge behind the 
borders of a state that is, at least in principle, a sovereign nation, they 
avoid capture by other states, whose governments may be reluctant to 
cross international boundaries to catch them.64 At the same time, 
those terrorists may believe that other concerned states have little 
hope of cooperating with the barely functioning governments of 
failed states on counterterrorism operations.65 
57 See Rice, supra note 8. 
58 See Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 10. 
59 See Mallaby, supra note 8; U.S. State Department, supra note 3. 
60 See Rotberg, Failed States in a World of Terror, supra note 10 (discussing the inability of 
failed states to project power within their borders). 
61 See Rice, supra note 8. 
62 !d. 
63 See Moises Nairn, The Five Wars of Globalization, FoREIGN PoL'Y, Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 35. 
64 See Michael Bonafede, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the Proportionality Doctrine 
and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism after the September 11 Attacks, 88 CoRNELL L. REv. 
155, 190 (2002) (discussing the breakdown of the proportionality doctrine in the context 
of international terrorism). 
65 See U.S. State Department, supra note 3 (describing the lack of central government, 
legal system, and national security force in Somalia). The United States has worked closely 
with some very weak governments on counterterrorism operations. See Seymour M. Hersh, 
Manhunt: The Bush Administration's New Strategy in the War Against Terrorism, THE NEw 
YoRKER, Dec. 23, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Newyrk File (describing a joint American-
Yemeni mission to kill a suspected al Qaeda member in Yemen). It has chosen not to work 
with some other governments. See Blomfield, supra note 1 (noting lack of cooperation on 
the part of the Somali transitional government in a U.S. raid to capture a suspected al 
Qaeda terrorist). 
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B. Global Terrorism: VVhy It Is Changing International Law 
U.S. citizens live in an age of paradox.66 The United States is an 
unrivaled superpower among nation-states, yet its citizens are Vlllner-
able to surprise attack by militarily unsophisticated terrorists who rec-
ognize no borders.67 President George W. Bush put state sponsors of 
terror on notice when he declared that "any nation that continues to 
harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a 
hostile regime."68 Pakistan has stepped up efforts to arrest and extra-
dite suspected terrorists.69 Open societies such as the United States 
and the European Union have increased border controls and surveil-
lance of suspected terrorist groups.70 These measures may have made 
it more difficult for terrorists to thrive in countries with strong central 
governments and effective governance.71 
Nonetheless, the United States and its allies face a formidable 
foe.72 Technology has empowered terrorist organizations in ways that 
are fundamentally new.73 First, terrorist organizations have benefited 
from the revolution in information and business technology in the last 
decade. 74 Advanced communications systems have made possible the 
proliferation and expansion of terrorist networks across the globe.75 
Moreover, advances in communications technology make it harder to 
track and catch terrorists, since they can plan and execute their attacks 
using encrypted e-mail, cell phones, and pagers, spread out among 
dozens or hundreds of operatives, to conceal their activities. 76 
66 See JosEPHS. NYE,JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN PoWER: WHY THE WoRLD's ONLY 
SuPERPOWER CAN'T Go IT ALoNE 75 (2002) (noting the illusory nature of traditional 
measures of America's predominance). 
67 See id. at 93;John Lewis Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, FoREIGN PoL'Y, Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 
51-52. 
68 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the United States Response to the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1349 (Sept. 20, 2001). 
69 See, e.g., The Other War, supra note 32, at 24. 
7o See generally For Whom the Liberty Bell Tolls, supra note 31, at 18-20. 
71 See generally id. (discussing the enactment and enforcement of strict antiterrorism 
measures). 
72 See generally JENKINS, supra note 14, at 17-21 (describing the threats posed by the al 
Qaeda terrorist organization). 
73 See generally THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION 325-29 (1999) (discussing how the availability of technology has empow-
ered individual terrorists). 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id.; Follow the Leader, THE EcoNOMIST, Dec. 1, 2001, at 23 (describing how Osama 
bin Laden's followers warned him of an imminent U.S. missile attack against him using a so-
phisticated radio network). 
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Second, terrorist groups benefit from the growing power of non-
state criminal actors. 77 The growth of international organized crime 
rings profiting from diamond smuggling, drug trafficking, forced 
prostitution, child slavery, and other illicit activities can also be tied to 
the financing of terrorist networks.7s 
Third, the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction have made possible a terrorist group armed with 
nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.79 Whereas during the Cold 
War the possibility of mass destruction was tightly controlled by a few, 
mostly risk-averse states, today weapons of mass destruction may find 
their way into the hands of individuals whose sole purpose is to kill civil-
ians. so The September 11 attacks demonstrated that mass casualties are 
not limited to attacks with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.81 
Nonetheless, it is clear that the attacks would have been much worse if 
such weapons were involved.82 A one-kiloton nuclear device-hundreds 
of times smaller than the bombs stockpiled by the United States and 
Russia-detonated in the World Trade Center complex would have 
likely killed everyone in Manhattan.s3 
As technology has empowered networks of terrorist groups over 
the past decade, the aims of the groups have also changed. It used to 
be the conventional wisdom that terrorists wanted "a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead. "84 This seemed to be so in part 
because most terrorist organizations had specific political goals and 
political constituencies.85 They used terror as a tactic for making de-
mands (for instance, political independence) to government authori-
ties on behalf of a larger group of supporters.86 Too many civilian 
casualties would have repulsed their constituencies.87 
77 See Mallaby, supra note 8. 
78 See id. (discussing how trade in black market diamonds has benefited Lebanon's 
Hezbollah). 
79 See generally jESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 9 (1999). 
80 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15. 
81 See Mark Huband, Terr01ism Comes In from Edge of the World, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Sept. 5, 2002, at 9 (noting the mass casualties that occurred on September 11, 2001). 
82 See STERN, supm note 79, at 1-2 (noting the devastation that a nuclear attack would 
cause in Manhattan). 
83 See id. 
84 Id. at 76 (quoting Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins). 
85 See generally David Fromkin, The Strategy of Terrorism, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1975, 1'e-
printed in THE AMERICAN ENcoUNTER 336, 345-47 (James F. Hoge, Jr. & Fareed Zakaria 
eds., 1997) (noting changing trends in international terrorism). 
86 See id. at 345. 
87 See id. at 347; STERN, supra note 79, at 76. 
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Today, in contrast, it has become evident that many terrorist or-
ganizations no longer seek to avoid mass casualties in their terror at-
tacks.88 In fact, as the September 11 attacks showed, groups such as al 
Qaeda seem intent on killing as many civilians as possible.89 The U.S. 
State Department reports that Osama bin Laden has professed that 
the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction is a "religious duty" 
and has threatened to use them against civilian populations.9° Al 
Qaeda appears to lack any type of political agenda aside from killing 
civilians, and its supporters are radicalized individuals who are em-
boldened, not repulsed, by civilian deaths.91 
The individual terrorist operatives have also changed. Today, 
many terrorist missions are accomplished by young men (and in some 
cases women) who know they will never reap the rewards of their 
work (except perhaps in an afterlife promised by their leaders).92 In 
Israel, suicide bombing has become the norm. 93 Suicide missions also 
appear to be acceptable to al Qaeda operatives, such as the Septem-
ber 11 hijackers and later would-be terrorists, including convicted 
"shoebomber," Richard Reid, who in December 2001 tried to blow up 
an airplane by detonating explosives hidden in his sneakers.94 
88 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15. 
89 See Robin Allen & Carola Hoyos, Millionaire, Terrorist, Fugitive, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Apr. 14, 2001, at 1 (noting Osama bin Laden's call to kill U.S. and British citizens any-
where in the world); Huband, supra note 81. 
90 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, supra note 8. 
91 PAULK. DAVIS & BRIAN JENKINS, DETERRENCE AND INFLUENCE IN COUNTERTERRORISM: 
A COMPONENT IN THE WAR ON AL QAEDA 4 (2002) (citing the appearance of mass casualties 
in terrorist attacks). 
92 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15; Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Mal-
eckova, Does Poverty Cause Terrorism1 The Economics and the Education of Suicide Bombers, THE 
NEW REPUBLic, June 24, 2002, LEXIS, News Library, Newrpb File. 
93 See James Bennet, Suicide Bombing on Bus in Israel Leaves 15 Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2003, at A1; Dexter Filkins, Pair of Bombers Kill 23 in Israel; Reprisals Begin, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2003, at A1; Thomas Friedman, Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2002, at A21; Michael R. 
Gordon, Suicide Bomber Kills Israeli Soldier; Ending 6 Weeks of Quiet, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, 
atA9. 
94 Thanassis Cambanis, Sentenced to Life, Reid Denounces US, BosTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 
2003, at A1; Thanassis Cambanis, Shoebomber's Low-Tech Style Is Seen As Future of Terrorism, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 2003, at Bl. 
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II. THE UsE OF FORCE AND STATE ATTRIBUTION 
A. The U.N. and Self-Defense 
States attempt to justify preemptive missile strikes or commando 
raids against terrorists as an act of self-defense. 95 The self-defense ar-
gument in the war on terror is an appeal to common sense: the United 
States acts now to prevent terrorists from striking later.96 Yet, in most 
cases preemptive force against terrorists violates the U.N. Charter.97 Ar-
ticle 2 ( 4) of the Charter outlaws all use of force "against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. "98 Since the deci-
sion to use military force is more often the product of a calculation of 
national interest, not legal analysis, many states seek to justify their mili-
tary actions as an exercise of their inherent right of self-defense under 
Article 51-the only exception to Article 2(4) contained in the Char-
ter.99 Article 51 permits self-defense "if an armed attack occurs. "100 That 
clause has been interpreted to contain two limiting factors: force may 
be used only in response to (1) an armed attack that (2) has already 
occurred.101 Article 51 offers dubious justification for counterterrorist 
operations in most cases and is practically useless in supporting the use 
of force against terrorists in failed states.I02 
The "armed attack" element of Article 51 poses two problems. 
First, the term is not clearly defined.103 Armies crossing borders and 
bombs dropping into the territory of another state no doubt consti-
tute an armed attack.l04 Article 51 does not clearly state whether cov-
ert action, intervention in support of rebels, and support for terrorist 
95 See generally Bonafede, supra note 64, at 171-81. 
96 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15. 
97 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
98 !d. 
99 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Given the difficulties associated with obtaining U.N. Secu-
rity Council authorization for their military action, states have more often justified their 
use of force as an exercise of their right of self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Char-
ter. See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 171-81. 
1oo U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
101 See id. 
102 See Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of War: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARv.J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 539, 541-45 (2002) (citing the 
requirement of substantial involvement between the state and terrorist to implicate state 
responsibility). 
1°3 See id. at 541. 
104 See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and Rogue States: The Failure of the Charter 
Framework, 36 NEW ENG. L. REv. 735, 739 (2002). 
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actions are equivalent to an armed attack.105 In Nicaragua v. United 
States, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) found that where the 
intervening state sent in "armed bands, groups, irregulars, or merce-
naries" whose acts were as serious as those committed by regular 
armed forces, the intervention would amount to an armed attack and 
therefore justifY a forceful response. lOB 
The second problem with the armed attack element of Article 51 
is state attribution.107 Even if a terrorist act against the United States 
could be considered an armed attack for the purposes of Article 51, it 
would still have to be attributed to a particular state to justify the use 
of force against that state.1°8 The standard for state attribution is high; 
mere tolerance of terrorists on a state's soil is not enough to trigger 
state responsibility. 109 In the Tadic case, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former \Ugoslavia held that the acts of the Bosnian 
Serb army could be imputed to Serbia as long as Serbia exercised 
"overall control" over the Bosnian Serb forces. 110 In 2001, the U.N. 
International Law Commission (ILC) issued new guidelines on state 
attribution, finding that conduct by a group "acting on the instruc-
tions of, or under the direction and control of' a state could be at-
tributed to that state, and that conduct by a group "exercising ele-
ments of governmental authority in the absence or default of the 
official authorities" could be likewise be attributed to a state. 111 
Some have argued that a new norm for defining an armed attack 
emerged suddenly after the September 11 terrorist acts in the United 
States.l12 In October 2001, when the U.S. ambassador to the U.N. re-
ported to the Security Council on the beginning of U.S. military ac-
tion in Afghanistan, he labeled the terrorist acts "armed attacks that 
were carried out against the United States" that justified a U.S. re-
105 See id. at 740. 
106 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 14, at 103 (June 27). 
107 See Glennon, supra note 102, at 543 (suggesting the need for substantial involve-
ment on the part of the host state for the attribution requirement to be met). 
108 See id. 
109 See id. 
no Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A, PP 13-38 (lnt'l Crirn. 
Trib. for Former \Ugoslavia App. Chamber 1999), http:/ /www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/ 
judgement/ tad-aj990715e. pdf. 
111 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
GAOR International Law Commission, 55th Sess., at 45, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [here-
inafter ILC Report]. 
112 See Benjamin Langille, It's "Instant Custom": How the Bush DoctJine Became Law After 
the TeTroJist Attacks of September 11, 2001, 27 B.C. INT'L & CaMP. L. REv. 154 (2003). 
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sponse under Article 51.113 Concerning state attribution, the United 
States argued that Taliban support for al Qaeda meant essentially that 
Mghanistan had launched an armed attack against the United States, 
which justified a U.S. response under Article 51.114 The U.S. ambassa-
dor's letter to the U.N. claimed that "the attacks on 11 September 
2001 and the ongoing threat to the United States ... posed by the Al-
Qaeda organization have been made possible by the decision of the 
Taliban regime to allow the parts of Mghanistan that it controls to be 
used by this organization as a base of operation. "115 Neither the Secu-
rity Council nor the General Assembly adopted any resolutions con-
demning the launch of military operations against the Taliban and al 
Qaeda, which suggests tacit approval of the United States' characteri-
zation of the terrorist acts and its use of force in Mghanistan.116 
The second limiting factor in Article 51 is the requirement that an 
armed attack must have already occurred.l17 Past practice concerning 
preemptive force, even after the establishment of the U.N. Charter, is 
inconclusive.118 On the one hand, the United States and many Western 
nations did not reject Israel's contention that its six-day pre-emptive war 
against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan was an act of self-defense.ll9 On the 
other hand, U.N. Security Council members, including the United 
States, condemned Israel's 1981 bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor 
in Iraq, which Israeli leaders claimed was to be used to produce mate-
rial for nuclear weapons that could threaten Israel.l20 
B. Article 51 and Failed States 
Article 51 may have justified the use of force in Mghanistan, 
where the links between the September 11 terror attacks, al Qaeda 
terrorists, and their Taliban sponsors were clear.l2l It does not, how-
ever, justify the use of military force against terrorists hiding in failed 
113 Letter Dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of Amer-
ica to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the SecUJity Council, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. 
S/2001/946 (2001) [hereinafter Letter from Representative of the U.S.]. 
114 !d. 
115 !d. 
116 See Langille, supra note 112, at 154-55. 
117 U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
118 See generally Arend, supra note 104, at 743 (noting that the goal of eliminating 
weapons of mass destruction may not justifY preemptive use of force). 
119 See Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of Military Force, 18 
WIS. INT'L LJ. 145, 164 (2000). 
120 Arend, supra note 104, at 743-44. 
121 See Letter from Representative of the U.S., supra note 113. 
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states whose governments do not sponsor terrorism.122 In contrast to 
state sponsors of terrorism, many failed states cannot be held liable 
for the actions of terrorists within their borders because of their in-
ability to control non-state actors on their territory.123 These failed 
states are unable to issue instructions or control the operations of ter-
rorists within their borders.124 The threat of armed attack posed by 
those terrorists cannot be attributed to the failed states.125 Thus, mili-
tary intervention in failed states to capture or kill terrorists cannot be 
justified as self-defense under Article 51.126 
C. Limited Force and Article 2(4) 
Preemptive strikes against terrorists in failed states may not be 
justified under Article 51, but that does not necessarily mean that they 
are illegal under the U.N. Charter.127 Article 51 appears to be an ex-
ception to the Charter's ban on certain uses of military force.l28 If 
strikes against terrorists in failed states fall outside the ban on the use 
of force, then the requirements of Article 51 need not apply.129 
As noted above, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter outlaws the use of 
force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations. "130 In the con text of the war on terror, it may be argued that a 
limited use of force targeting a terrorist organization on another state's 
territory would not violate that state's territorial integrity or political 
independence and thus would not contradict Article 2(4).13l Such use 
of limited force, so the argument goes, "is not directed against the per-
sons or property of the 'host' country, is not designed to gain or hold 
territory, and does not seek to overthrow or otherwise influence the 
122 See Glennon, supra note 102, at 541-45; Harold Hongju Koh, The Spi1it of the Laws, 
43 HARV. INT'L LJ. 23, 28 (2002). 
125 See id. 
124 See, e.g., Rice, supra note 8; U.S. State Department, supra note 3 (stating that be-
cause "Somalia has no national government at present ... [e]conomic sanctions were ap-
plied [directly to the terrorist group] Al-Ittihad"). 
125 See /LC Report, supra note Ill (a terrorist threat coming from a failed state does not 
meet the state attribution requirements in Article 8 of the Draft Articles included in the 
Report). 
126 See U.N. CHARTER art. 51; Glennon, supra note 102, at 543-45. 
127 See Koh, supra note 122, at 28 (citing the need to rethink Article 2(4) in the case of 
preventing terrorist attacks). 
12s See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
129 See id.; Travalio, supra note 119, at 166. 
150 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
151 SeeTravalio, supra note 119, at 166. 
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nature of the host government" and therefore would not be proscribed 
by Article 2(4).132 Moreover, eliminating the threat of terrorism is con-
sistent with the principles of the U.N.133 Numerous General Assembly 
Resolutions and Conventions have condemned terrorism as a prac-
tice.l34 For instance, Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 
September 2001 reaffirmed that terrorist acts constitute "threats to in-
ternational peace and security" and resolved that states should take all 
necessary steps to prevent terrorist acts.I35 
Yet, when applied to most states, this argument seems flawed. 
One scholar has noted that "most uses of force, no matter how brief, 
limited, or transitory, do violate a state's territorial integrity."I36 Even a 
limited, temporary, targeted operation to eliminate a terrorist threat, 
when it crosses international borders, may in fact constitute a viola-
tion of the territorial integrity or political independence of the "host" 
state.l37 The right to control entry into a state goes to the heart of ter-
ritorial integrity and has its roots in the very notion of state sover-
eignty.l38 Surely, infiltration of a state's borders by armed commandos 
would deny that state the right to regulate who enters and who stays 
on its territory.l39 If political independence includes the right to de-
cide, without outside interference, how to conduct one's affairs within 
one's own borders, then the destruction wrought by missile strikes or 
the violence resulting from commando raids should also violate po-
litical independence.I40 
Furthermore, regardless of the U.N.'s condemnation of terrorism 
as a tactic, the U.N. Charter is construed to prevent unilateral use of 
132 Id. at 167. 
133 Id. 
154 Id. 
135 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373 (2001); U.N. 
SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001). 
136 Travalio, supra note 119, at 169 (quoting RoSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE UsE IT 240 (1994)). 
137 Travalio, supra note 119, at 169. 
!!IS SeeChae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603-04, 609 (1889) (finding that 
':jurisdiction over its own territory ... is an incident of every independent nation" and "the 
power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the 
government of the United States, as a part of these sovereign powers delegated by the 
Constitution, the right to its exercise ... cannot be ... restrained on behalf of any one"). 
159 See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 865th mtg., at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960) 
(resolving that the incursion of Israeli agents into Argentina to capture war criniinal Adolf 
Eichmann was a "violation of the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic"). 
140 See MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: 
INTERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo 22 (2001) (suggesting that NATO's use of force against 
Thgoslavia in 1999 violated Thgoslavia's territorial integrity). 
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force that crosses international borders and intervention into another 
state's domestic affairs.141 In particular, Article 2(7) prohibits inter-
vention "in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state. "142 This language may bar even use of limited force 
as inconsistent with the "Purposes of the United Nations. "143 
It seems likely that the preemptive use of force against terrorists 
in most countries would be a violation of those countries' sover-
eignty;144 however, failed states do not share the characteristics of 
most states.145 Furthermore, the extreme danger posed by interna-
tional terrorists calls for new thinking about sovereignty.l46 
III. WHEN Is FoRcEjusTIFIED? 
A. Territmial Integrity and Political Independence of Failed States 
It may be argued that the use of limited military force to strike ter-
rorists in failed states does not violate Article 2 of the U.N. Charter.147 A 
limited use of force would not violate a failed state's territorial integrity 
because a failed state by definition does not exercise meaningful con-
trol over its borders or territory.148 Likewise, such force would not be a 
violation of a failed state's political independence since no functioning 
political decision-making process exists. 149 Moreover, the limited nature 
of the use of force would mitigate the effects on the state's independ-
ence and territorial integrity.l5° For one thing, such uses of force would 
be highly specific, of limited duration, against defined terrorist targets, 
and with minimal impact on the state and its population.151 For an-
141 See Karsten Nowrot & Emily W. Schabacker, The Use of Force to Restore Democracy: 
International Legal Implications of the ECOWAS Intervention in Sierra Leone, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. 
REV. 321, 344-45 (1998). 
142 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. 
143 See id. 
144 SeeTravalio, supra note 119, at 169. 
145 See Rotberg, Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States, supra note 36, at 2. 
146 See Koh, supra note 122, at 28; Travalio, supra note 119, at 165 (noting the 
inapplicability of current interpretations of Article 2(4) to the use of force to prevent 
terrorist attacks). 
14' See Travalio, supra note 119, at 166. 
148 See id.; Rice, supra note 8 (defining failed states as "countries in which the central 
government does not exert effective control over, nor is it able to deliver vital services to, 
significant parts of its own territory due to conflict, ineffective governance or state 
collapse"). 
149 See id. 
150 SeeTravalio, supra note 119, at 166. 
151 See Shanker & Risen, supra note 4. 
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other, the armed forces carrying out the counterterrorist raids would 
be fulfilling a function the failed state would be obligated to perform, if 
it were able to do so.I52 
This proposition also suffers from conceptual and practical 
difficulties. State failure has no legal meaning under international 
law.I53 States have legal personality that outlives any one regime or 
government, and their status cannot be terminated by other states.154 
Moreover, the criteria for statehood are interpreted quite flexibly.I 55 
As presented in the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of 
States, they include a permanent population, a defined territory, a 
government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other 
states. "156 Traditionally, lack of a standing army, ill-defined borders, 
and military occupation have not deprived states of statehood, and, 
thus far, no state has contended that countries such as Sudan or So-
malia, where the central government has collapsed, are no longer 
states.157 
Moreover, the risks of a policy justifying use of force against sus-
pected terrorists in failed states are great. First is the danger of creating 
a customary rule of international law that allows states to invade their 
neighbors whenever they deem that "state failure" has occurred.l58 The 
potential for abuse could create, as some scholars have argued, a "le-
gion of loopholes" in the U.N. Charter.159 For example, Russia has 
threatened to strike suspected Chechen terrorists hiding in neighbor-
ing Georgia, also citing self-defense under Article 5}.160 Though not a 
failed state, Georgia is a weak state that has suffered from years of civil 
war; its government struggles to control its territory.161 With this in 
mind, President Vladimir Putin has written to U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan, claiming that Georgian passivity toward Chechen fighters 
on its territory violates U.N. Security Council resohttions_I62 Meanwhile, 
152 See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 194 n.219. 
153 See Thomas D. Grant, Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents, 
37 CoLUM. J. 'TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 435 (1999) (noting that lack of effective control over 
territory does not imply loss of statehood). 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 Id. at 414. 
157 Id. at 435. 
158 SeeNowrot & Schabacker, supra note 141, at 339. 
159 Jd. 
160 SeePutin's Georgia Ploy, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 16,2002, atA14. 
161 Rice, supra note 8. 
162 See Stephen Sestanovich, Putin Has His Own Candidate for[-,, , ,flption, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 2002, § 4, at 14. 
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Russia's top military leader asserted in 2002 that the Georgian presi-
dent was no different from the Taliban.163 If Russia's rhetoric were to 
become reality, there would be little to stop invading states from invok-
ing a "failed state doctrine" whenever they wished, simply by declaring 
that their victim had been unable to control the "terrorist groups" 
within its borders.164 
Second, and more important, is the possibility of civilian casual-
ties, even where targets are narrowly limited to known terrorist opera-
tives.165 Mistakes happen in the fog of war, despite the extensive pre-
cautions that highly skilled and disciplined forces may take, as 
operations in Mghanistan have demonstrated.l66 
Finally, there is something troubling about a foreign policy that 
values U.S. security-and U.S. lives-so much more highly than the 
lives of ordinary Somalis, Sudanese, or other inhabitants of designated 
failed states.167 Dispatching commandos or launching missile strikes to 
capture or kill suspected terrorists, while ignoring the plight of the sick, 
starving, and war-ravaged people next door seems callous and, in the 
long term, irresponsible.l68 U.S. citizens may reasonably ask what values 
their government is protecting if it spends millions to kill a suspected 
terrorist who may or may not threaten their lives, while refusing to de-
vote more resources to alleviating the immediate suffering of those who 
have no choice but to live in countries whose governments have col-
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 SeeTravalio, supm note 119, at 173. 
166 See, e.g., Afghanistan's Civilian Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at A30; see also 
Hersh, supm note 65 (describing a joint U.S.-Yemeni counterterrorism operation in Yemen 
where an attack on a group of Bedouins traveling in the desert incorrectly identified by 
U.S. intelligence as a! Qaeda members was called off at the last moment when a Yemeni 
official discovered the mistake). 
167 See Thomas Donnelly & Vance Serchuk, Leave No Continent Behind, Wash. Post, July 
7, 2003, at A17 (noting U.S. unwillingness to engage in peacekeeping in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and Liberia, and the withdrawal of U.S. peacekeepers from Somalia in 
1993). 
168 See id.; Pamela Constable, Afghan Poppies Sprout Again, Wash. Post, Nov. 10, 2003, at 
A16 (discussing the explosive growth in poppy production in Mghanistan by impoverished 
farmers after U .S.-led military operations there). 
472 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:453 
lapsed.169 This is particularly so in states, such as Somalia and Haiti, 
where U.S. foreign policy may have contributed to state collapse.170 
B. Toward a Doctrine of Counterterrorist Intervention in Failed States 
The nature of global terrorist groups such as al Qaeda presents a 
growing challenge to the international system of sovereign nation-
states.171 When terrorists hide behind the borders of nonfunctioning 
states, they avoid detection and capture by other states whose citizens 
they target.172 Despite the risks associated with it, a "failed state 
doctrine" may be appropriate if the dangers it poses are properly 
limited.l73 As the discussion above illustrates, ·identification of failed 
states should be strictly controlled.l74 
Since identification is inherently political-state failure being in 
the eye of the beholder-failed states should be designated as such 
only by a resolution of the U.N. Security CounciJ.l75 Security Council 
members could weigh the totality of the circumstances in a given 
state, considering the absence or presence of traditional factors that 
determine statehood, such as defined territory, the capacity to enter 
into relations with other states, an identifiable population, as well as 
an ability to stand on its own.l76 The Security Council's experience 
with authorizing peacekeeping missions in post-conflict areas could 
provide a useful precedent for such a consideration.177 A designation 
169 See Henry ]. Richardson, Ill, "Failed States, " Self-Determination and Preventive 
Diplomacy: Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 1, 8 
(1996). 
170 See Tim Weiner & Lydia Polgreen, Facing New Crisis, Haiti Again Relies on U.S. Mili-
tary to Keep 0Tder, N.Y Times, Mar. 7, 2004, § 1, at 18 (discussing the United States' prema-
ture departure from Haiti in 1996, following the 1994 military intervention). 
171 See generally jENKINS, supra note 14, at 17-21 (describing the unique nature of the al 
Qaeda terrorist organization). 
172 See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 90. 
173 See Koh, supra note 122, at 28. But cf Richardson, supm note 169, at 8. 
174 See Nowrot & Schabacker, supm note 141, at 339. 
175 Veto power in the U.N. Security Council should rule out politically-motivated, 
illegitimate designation of certain states as a pretext for invasion. The United States, for 
instance, would likely veto a Russian proposal to designate its neighbor Georgia as a failed 
state. See Sestanovich, supm note 162. Alternatively, another permanent member of the 
Security Council could have political motivations to veto a U.S. proposal to designate 
Somalia or Sudan as a failed state. 
176 See Grant, supm note 153, at 438. 
177 Indeed, Somalia's collapse in 1992 was recognized in Security Council Resolutions 
794 and 814, which authorized the unsuccessful "Operation Restore Hope" mission. Walter 
S. Clarke & Robert Gosende, Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itselfl, in STATE 
FAILURE AND STATE WEAKNESS IN A TIME OF TERROR, supra note 8, at 142. 
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of state failure would be followed by a concentrated U.N.-led program 
to rebuild state structures and provide interim humanitarian relief.I7s 
This practice would also follow the precedent established by other 
U.N.-authorized peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.I79 
States intending to use limited military force against terrorists in 
failed states should meet a high standard in showing that their actions 
are justified by the failed state's inability to rid itself of terrorist 
groups. 180 Specifically, the intervening state should show evidence of 
the presence in the failed state of known international terrorists 
whose activities present the substantial likelihood that another state's 
population will be harmed in an act of terrorism.ISI vVhen that stan-
dard is met, the Security Council should authorize limited use of 
force by the intervening state or states against those terrorists.1s2 An 
intervening state that cannot meet that standard will have violated 
Article 2(4) ofthe U.N. Charter.I83 
Of course, even if such military action does not violate Article 
2(4), it still must conform to customary international law, including 
the law on anticipatory self-defense.184 The Bush Administration has 
argued that a customary right of anticipatory self-defense supersedes 
the U.N. Charter.185 The basis in international law for this customary 
right is the 160-year-old Caroline case, which involved a preemptory 
British attack against insurgents operating from the U.S. side of the 
border with Canada.186 The British attacked the Caroline, a ship used 
by the insurgents that was located on the U.S. side of the border.IS7 
The U.S. Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, in a letter to the British 
Minister, asserted that the use of force in self-defense should be lim-
178 But cf Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, AM. U. J. 
INT'L L. & PoL'v 903, 924 (1997) (describing proposals to "recolonize" failed states and 
noting the problems such proposals involve). 
179 See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUB. INFORMATION, THE UNITED NATIONS AND 
CAMBODIA, 1991-1995, at 5-10 (1995). 
180 See, e.g., ILC Report, supra note ll1, at 49 (discussing "necessity" doctrine allowing 
states to act to "safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril"). 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
183 See discussion of U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, supra notes 127-30 and 
accompanying text. 
184 See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 165 (discussing the Caroline case as customary 
in ternationallaw). 
185 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 5, at 15 ("For centuries, international 
law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lav.fully take action 
to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack."). 
186 See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 166. 
187 See id. 
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ited to cases in which the necessity is "instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation."188 Thus, the 
rule developed from the Caroline case included two preconditions for 
preemptive force: that it be necessary to eliminate a threat, and that 
the threat be imminent.IS9 A failed state doctrine must not contradict 
the principles of the Caroline case-namely, that preemptive force may 
be used only when it is necessary to thwart an imminent attack.I90 
Moreover, it must be proportionate to the terrorist threat posed.191 
In some cases, the threat posed by a terrorist group will be so 
grave that it is necessary to take action immediately, without revealing 
evidence publicly beforehand.192 For instance, in cases where the in-
tervening state has reason to believe the terrorist groups in question 
possess weapons of mass destruction, and are prepared to use them, 
the risk of inaction may greatly outweigh the costs of action. 193 Thus, 
in such cases, the intervening state should have to show that the 
"host" state was unable to deal with the weapons of mass destruction 
and not necessarily prove that it was a failed state.I94 
CoNcLusiON 
U.S. policymakers are focusing needed attention on the dangers 
state failure poses to international security in a time of global terror-
ism. The lawlessness and disorder that result from state failure make 
failed states attractive safe havens for terrorist groups. The United 
States is planning operations targeting al Qaeda terrorists located in 
various states around the world. Yet preemptive use of military force, 
even against terrorists, probably contravenes the U.N. Charter be-
cause it violates the territorial integrity and political independence of 
the states where the terrorists are located. A close reading of the U.N. 
Charter, however, suggests that the use of limited force against terror-
ists in failed states may not violate the Charter when state failure pre-
vents a state from maintaining its territorial integrity or exercising po-
litical independence. 
188 See Travalio, supra note 119, at 162. 
189 See id. 
190 See Bonafede, supra note 64, at 166. 
191 See id. 
192 See Shanker & Risen, supra note 4. 
193 See Koh, supra note 122, at 28 (suggesting that intervention to prevent crimes 
against humanity, including massive terrorist attacks, would outweigh the costs of violating 
another state's sovereignty). 
194 See id. 
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States that are the targets of terrorist attacks should be able to use 
preemptive military force against terrorist groups in failed states, where 
the collapse of security institutions makes fighting terrorists impossible. 
The use of limited military force in such circumstances may prevent 
terrorist attacks and make the world safer. As such, it is a necessary 
short-term strategy. Yet, the United States and its allies should not lose 
sight of the underlying problems that make state failure a threat to in-
ternational security. Only by engaging in the difficult and costly busi-
ness of institution-building can the United States prevent and reverse 
state failure and deny terrorists safe haven in the long term. 
